Summary: Ilayaraja’s legal battles arguably reshape composer rights, song royalties, and copyright ownership in the Indian film industry, as this article explores.
The Delhi High Court, in Saregama vs. VELS Films and Mr. Ilaiyaraaja v. Saregama India Limited, opened the door to interpretation of rights between the Producers and the Music Composer (which would by necessary implication also include the lyricist.). The view that the Producer owns it all for works prior to 2012 may need a relook if not a rethink.
In Mr. Ilaiyaraaja vs. Saregama India Limited (2026:DHC:4556-Division Bench) the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court considers the ownership of underlying works in the Sound Recordings incorporated in a cinematographic film created prior to the 2012 Amendments to the Copyright Act, 1957 (“the Act”).
Findings of the Single Judge
Before reviewing the order of the Division Bench, one needs to understand the context of the findings, for which it would be useful to look at what was held by the Single Judge in Saregama India Limited v. Vels Film International Ltd. Ors. (CS (Comm) 38/2025) –
- In relation to the works that are the subject matter of the lis, since created prior to 2012, the law prior to the 2012 Amendments would apply.
- The 2012 Amendments are prospective in nature and cannot be considered to operate in a retrospective manner.
- As per Section 17 of the Act, the producer of a cinematograph film or sound recording is the first owner of copyright in sound recording, literary works, musical and other works that form part of the cinematograph film; Saregama subsequently owned the right by way of the assignment from the Producer.
- The rights of the music composer under Section 14(1)(v) are exhausted in view of Section 17(b) of the Act.
- The music composer is entitled to carry out all the other acts in terms of Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, except to make any cinematograph film or a record (now, sound recording post 1995).
- The Impugned song used lyrics and Sound Recordings besides the musical composition over which the composer of the musical composition had no right over.
- The Defendants had used the lyrics and musical composition to cause a fresh sound recording (this may be relevant while looking at the Division Bench Order).
- Given the song was incorporated in a cinematographic film that was ready for release, the balance of convenience was in favour of the Defendant, and a sum of INR 30 Lakhs was directed to be deposited (the sum was based of the Plaintiff’s estimate of what the License fee would be).
Findings of the Division Bench
The Division Bench was in agreement with the justification of the Single Judge in terms of the injunction order and therefore did not vary the ultimate outcome.
The Division Bench held that without a license from Saregama, the producers of the film could not exploit any of the sound recordings, including the sound recording of the original song owned by Saregama. The Division Bench held, “By recreating/ adapting the Sound Recording, therefore, VFIL has infringed the Copyright of SIL.”
Analysis of the Division Bench decision
I am not clear if it was the same Sound Recording that was being exploited as the Single Judge stated that a new sound recording had been created. In fact, a review petition was filed by Mr. Ilaiyaraaja in relation to the sound recording arguing that it was not the sound recording which was in question before the Court. The review petition was dismissed with the Court holding in Paragraph 8 very clearly that Ilaiyaraaja could not have licensed the Copyright in the Sound recording or the Lyrics. In my view, even if it was a new sound recording, Ilaiyaraaja, not having the rights to the lyrics, could not have licensed the incorporation of the lyrics in a new sound recording.
While Section 14 (e) of the Act does not give an exclusive right to the owner in relation to re-creating/ adapting a sound recording, my understanding is that the Division Bench referred to the act of creating a new sound recording, which was not permissible. The Division Bench disapproved Ilaiyaraaja’s claim, in an agreement in relation to the work in question, that the author of the Music Composition owned the rights in the lyrics and sound recording.
However, the findings on musical composition are significant.
In paragraph 28.1, the Division Bench holds:
“However, this right of adaptation was limited to the musical work, i.e., the musical component of the disputed song, as that was the extent of Ilaiyaraaja’s copyright in the disputed song. The lyrics of the disputed song were no man’s land, and Ilaiyaraaja would have no Copyright over the lyrics, and, consequently, none of the rights envisaged under section 14 (a) would be available to Ilaiyaraaja in so far as a lyrics in the disputed songs were concerned.”
The Division Bench further states in para 28.3:
“Ilaiyaraaja was, therefore, entitled to contract with any third party for use, or for adaptation, of the musical work contained in the disputed song, i.e., the musical component thereof. That right could not, however, extend to doing anything involving the sound recording of the disputed song, or the lyrics thereof. Copyright in the sound recording of the disputed song would, by conjoint application of section 17, 2(d) and 2(f), vest in the producer of the film of which the song constituted part of the soundtrack, whereas copyright in the lyrics of the disputed song would, by application of Section 2(d)(i), vest in the lyricist.”
The above paragraph makes it clear that the Division Bench delineated authorship of the lyrics with that of the musical composition. However, it does seem to suggest that Ilaiyaraaja had the rights in the musical composition. This is fortified by the following paragraphs:
“29.5 By operation of section 13(4), the copyright, if any, held by RCA and, later, by SIL, in the sound recording relating to the musical work contained in the disputed song cannot derogate from, or affect, the separate copyright held by Ilayaraja in the musical work contained in the disputed song. Ilaiyaraaja’s copyright in the musical work contained in the disputed song, therefore, continues to remain protected and, consequently, his right to exploit the musical work in the manner envisaged by Section 14 (a)(iv) and 14 (a)(v) read with 14 (a)(vi), also remains inviolate and sacrosanct.”
“29.6 This right was, however, necessarily limited to the musical component of the disputed song, i.e., the music therein, of which Ilaiyaraaja was the composer. It did not extend to the lyrical component of, on the sound recording in, the disputed song.”
Paragraph 30, a brief paragraph of eight words, reflects the Court’s thoughts while upholding the Judgement on appeal “And it is there that the scales tilt.”
My reading is that the incorporation of the lyrics that were authored by the person other than Ilaiyaraaja, disentitled the latter from giving a license in relation to the lyrics, thereby making the song an infringement.
This is reiterated in paragraph 31.3 of the judgement which states,
“31.3. However, Ilaiyaraaja was not the owner of the copyright in the sound recording, or the lyrics underlying the disputed song. His Copyright was limited to the musical work, the very definition of which, in Section 2(p), excludes the lyrical component of the song. Ilaiyaraaja could not, therefore, have assigned, to VFIL, the lyrics underlying the disputed song.”
In my reading of the Judgement, the reasons set out for the grant of injunction are twofold.
a) Ilaiyaraaja did not have the rights in the lyrics;
b) Ilaiyaraaja did not have rights in the sound recording (I am not clear if this is an issue or only related to Ilaiyaraaja’s covenants in the Agreement with the producer as the Single Judge did state that a new sound recording had been created).
In relation to the musical compositions, the Division Bench appears to take the view that the rights vest with Ilaiyaraaja. The Division Bench has relied on Section 13(4) of the Act to aid this interpretation.
The interpretation of the Supreme Court in the Indian Performing Rights Society v. Eastern Indian Motion Picture Association and Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 820, holds the field for works prior to 2012. I am extracting a portion that may support the view taken by the Division Bench:
“Thus if an author (composer) of the lyric or musical work authorises a cinematographic film producer to make a cinematographic film of his composition by recording it on the soundtrack of a cinematograph film, he cannot complain of the infringement of his copyright if the author( owner) of a cinematograph film causes the lyric or musical work recorded on the soundtrack of the film to be heard in public and nothing contained in section 13(4) of the Act on which Mr. Ashok Sen has strongly relied can operate to affect the rights acquired by the author (owner) of the film by virtue of Section 14 (1)(c) of the Act. The composer of the lyrics or a musical work, however, retains the right of performing it in public for profit otherwise than as part of the cinematographic film and he cannot be restrained from doing so. In other words, the author (composer) of a lyric or a musical work who has authorised a cinematographic film producer to make a cinematograph film of his work and has thereby permitted him to appropriate his work by incorporating or recording it on the soundtrack of a cinematograph film and has thereby per permitted him to appropriate his work by incorporating or recording it on the soundtrack of a cinematograph film cannot restrain the author (owner) of the film from causing the acoustic portion of the film to be performed or projected or screened in public for profit or from making any record embodying the recording in any part of the sound track associated with the film by utilising such sound track or communicating or authorising the communication of the film by radio diffusion, as Section 14 (1)(c) of the Act expressly permits the owner of the copyright of the cinematograph film to do all these things.” [emphasis added]
One wonders if an interpretation of this judgement can turn on the word ‘The’ as opposed to ‘a’ as underlined in the paragraph above. I have previously written how the context of the IPRS case (supra) is often lost. The case emanated from the IPRS applying to the Copyright Board to fix rates when lyrics and musical compositions that were incorporated in sound recordings and thereby in films were communicated to the public in cinema halls. An important factor to consider is the constitution of IPRS at the time consisted only of lyricists and the music composers (no producer or music companies). Hence, the phrase “producer defeating the rights of the Author” is used in the judgement.
Therefore, perhaps use of ‘the’ related only to the film in question and not a transfer of the right. In other words, the Author could not object to the exploitation by the Producer qua the film as also qua the Sound Recording. So does that mean that the retention in favour of the composer is for any other exploitation, other than the film or sound recording, as the Single Judge held, or is the retention of rights to the Composer beyond the scope of the particular cinematograph film and a sound recording? Has the composer exhausted all the avenues that envisage cinematographic films and sound recording or has a composer’s claim in relation to that particular Sound Recording and Cinematographic film (including works containing those works) been exhausted? Post 2012 the agreements are clear on these aspects but prior to 2012 the Division Bench has appeared to open a window.
The view of the Division has been followed in the cases of Saregama India Ltd. V. Black Madras Films & ors. (CS(Comm) 1310/2025) and Saregama India Ltd. v. Ilaiyaraaja (CS(Comm) 143/2026).
While an injunction was granted in these cases as well on account of unauthorised use of lyrics and the sound recording, the Single Judge states as follows:
“15. Ergo, the Producer of the cinematograph film would be the copyright owner of the sound recording embodied or incorporated into the said film. However, the composer i.e., defendant/ ILAIYARAAJA, by virtue of Section 2(d)(ii) would be the “author” and by virtue of the provisions of Sections 13(4) read with 14(1)(a) of the old Act and Section 14 (a) of the new Act, be vested with the copyrights over the musical composition alone. However, such rights cannot include the “sound recordings” which have necessarily been incorporated or embodied into the “cinematograph film”.
“17. It may be significant to note that, notwithstanding the above observations, the defendant/ ILAIYARAAJA would, in the humble opinion of this Court, undisputedly have, separate copyrights in the musical work contained in the disputed songs by operation of section 13(4) of the Act. As posited by the learned Division Bench, the defendant/ ILAIYARAAJA, consequently would have the rights to exploit the musical work in the manner envisaged by Sections 14 (a)(iv) and 14 (a)(v) read with 14 (a)(vi) of the Act.”
Given that it appears there is a retention of rights, the question will arise in relation to synchronisation of the musical composition with, say, some other lyrics, to form a new sound recording. At present, the producer/music company would grant the license. Does this Judgement mean that only the composer can grant the license or does the Producer/ Music company also retain the right? Could the existing Sound Recording be incorporated to create a new Sound Recording? Or synchronised with another work? Or is it only limited to the relevant cinematographic film?
In a sense, is the first ownership under Section 17 deemed to only relate to the sound recording and underlying works when incorporated in a cinematograph film allowing for exploitation of the sound recording that was incorporated in the cinematographic film? Clearly, the Courts do not consider this joint ownership but limit the ownership of producers, the extent to which will need to be tested.
The situation is novel as it is arguable that when the sound recording is exploited, the owner of the share of underlying works will be the producer. The same underlying works, when exploited in another sound recording, could have the author (or assignee) as owner. Interestingly, and perhaps arguably, in the event of, say, a performer in a concert, if the work performed consists of lyrics incorporated in the cinematographic film, then the producer would be deemed to be the owner, but say, if the composition was the same but the lyrics were new, arguably, the owner of the musical composition would be the author. The dichotomy, in my view, is not envisaged under the Copyright Act but could be contractually agreed. Post the 2012 Amendments; agreements do have clarity, but questions will arise in relation to works prior to the amendments.
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