India Rejects AI as Inventor: Landmark DABUS Patent Decision

Summary: The Indian Patent Office has refused to recognize artificial intelligence (AI) as a patent inventor. This note explains why the DABUS ruling reinforces human-centric inventorship under India’s Patents Act, 1970, and the implications for AI-driven innovation in India.

Overview

Artificial intelligence (AI) is now embedded across research, industry, and professional practice, and increasingly contributes to technical problem-solving beyond mere assistance. For patent law, a fundamental question has emerged: can an AI system be named the inventor if it has autonomously generated, or assisted in generating, an invention?

In refusing Indian Patent Application No. 202017019068 (part of the global DABUS filings), the Indian Patent Office (IPO) has held that an AI system cannot be named as an inventor under the Patents Act, 1970.

The DABUS filings are a series of international patent applications filed starting in 2018 by Stephen L. Thaler. In these filings, an AI system, DABUS (Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience), is named as the sole inventor. The objective of these filings has been to test whether an AI can be recognized as an inventor under patent laws in different jurisdictions. Already, multiple jurisdictions have rejected these applications, clarifying that their patent laws at present only recognise natural persons as inventors. India joins this list which includes Australia, the European Patent Office, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Presently, South Africa is the first jurisdiction to formally grant a DABUS patent listing an AI as the inventor.

Background

The applicant, Thaler, filed the national phase application in India titled “Food Container and Devices and Methods for Attracting Enhanced Attention,” naming DABUS as the inventor. The invention concerns a food container with a fractal-profile wall structure intended to improve coupling between containers. Like in other jurisdictions, the choice to list an AI system, rather than a human, as inventor became the central issue.

Issues

Although the First Examination Report (FER) also raised novelty and inventive-step objections, the Controller treated inventorship as a threshold defect: if DABUS could not be recognised as inventor, the application could not proceed to formal or technical examination. The following questions were framed around this application:

1. Can an AI system (DABUS) be recognised as a “true and first inventor” under the Patents Act, 1970 (the Act)?
2. Has the applicant complied with Sections 6, 7 and 10 on inventorship declarations and proof of right?
3. Can reliance on PCT Rule 4.17(ii) satisfy these statutory requirements?

Applicant’s case

Thaler’s core submission was that because DABUS allegedly generated the inventive concept autonomously, it should be named the “true and first inventor.” He argued that the Act does not expressly confine inventorship to humans and should be interpreted to accommodate technological change. He relied on:

• the Act’s use of the term “person” in a broad sense (i.e., it includes the Government) (under Section 2(1)(s));
• Section 2(1)(y), which defines “true and first inventor” by excluding importers and persons to whom the invention is first communicated from outside India (without stating “human”); and
• a declaration under PCT Rule 4.17(ii) (i.e., a declaration as to the applicant’s entitlement to apply for and be granted a patent).

Separately, on “proof of right,” Thaler emphasised that he owned the DABUS source code and the computer on which it ran, bore the costs of its operation, and had, in good faith, disclosed AI inventorship rather than attributing the invention to a human.

Controller’s Findings

The Controller rejected these submissions by treating inventorship and entitlement as statutory conditions that depend on legal personality. Referring to Section 6 of the Act, the Controller pointed out that a patent application may be made only by:

• a person claiming to be the true and first inventor,
• a person being the assignee of such inventor, or
• the legal representative of a deceased inventor.

These categories presuppose a natural person capable of holding rights, assigning them, making legally effective declarations, and being represented through succession. In this scheme, an AI system lacks the legal capacity to own property, enter into legal relations, incur obligations, or bear legal responsibility, and therefore cannot qualify as a “natural person” or any other legally recognised “person.”

Regarding Thaler’s argument that Section 2(1)(s) defines “person” to include Government and therefore inventorship is not restricted to natural persons, the Controller held that this argument did not support the intent of the Act. Had Parliament intended to extend recognition beyond a natural person, it would have done so expressly. As no exclusion was made for machines, the inclusion of Government within Section 2(1)(s) does not support the recognition of an AI system as an inventor.

The Controller also held that the statutory requirement to name and declare the inventor (including declarations under Sections 7(3) and 10(6)) necessarily assumes a legally competent person whose rights can be traced and transferred. Specifically, particulars to be provided include the nationality, address, and signature of the inventor, as well as a valid executed assignment where applicable. An AI system is inherently incapable of any of these things. The defence of procedural declarations under PCT Rule 4.17(ii) cannot apply here, as they cannot cure a defect where the designated inventor is not legally recognisable under Indian law.

On entitlement by way of ‘proof of right’, the Controller emphasised that, under Section 7(2), “proof of right” must be derived from the inventor. Ownership or control of a machine does not, by itself, establish a right to patent an invention said to have been generated by that machine, unless the right is assigned from a legally recognised inventor. Since DABUS could not be an inventor in law, it could not assign rights, and Thaler’s ownership of the system could not substitute for the statutory chain of title contemplated by the Act.

Thaler also relied on the 161st Report of the Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce on ‘Review of the Intellectual Property Rights Regime in India’  (2021), which recommended reconsidering India’s IP laws to address AI-generated inventions. The Controller acknowledged the policy debate but drew a firm line between recommendations and binding law. It held that  committee reports cannot override statutory provisions, and any expansion of inventorship must come from legislative amendment. As persuasive support, the Controller noted that multiple jurisdictions have similarly read “inventor” or “natural person” in patent statutes to mean a human being, aligning the IPO’s approach with the prevailing international position in the DABUS cases.

Conclusion

The IPO’s refusal of the DABUS application confirms that, under India’s current patent regime, inventorship is tied to legal personhood, as well as the ability to make declarations, hold and transfer rights, and the Act’s entitlement structure. While the IPO order acknowledges the growing technological and economic significance of AI, it clarifies that policy recommendations from parliamentary committees cannot be expansively interpreted to imply legislative sanction; only legislation can grant recognition to AI inventorship. Until such reform occurs, AI may remain a powerful tool in the inventive process, but not an inventor under Indian patent law.